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Basic Behavioral Processes Involved
in Procrastination
Thomas R. Zentall*
Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States
Procrastination involves an irrational putting off of engaging in a course of action,
in spite of expecting to be worse off for the delay. I suggest that to understand
the processes underlying procrastination one should examine its relation to several
behavioral procedures that have been studied in humans and other animals. For example,
in delay discounting, smaller rewards that come sooner are often preferred over larger
rewards that come later. In the context of delay discounting, procrastination can be
viewed as the preference for an immediate competing activity over the delay to work on
a required task. Another process similar to procrastination can be seen in free operant,
temporal avoidance (or Sidman avoidance) in which an animal will receive a shock (a
deadline not met) if an interval passes without a specified response (task completion).
Once animals learn about the interval, they often procrastinate by waiting until the interval
has almost passed before responding. Finally, research with animals suggests that the
persistence of procrastination may involve a form of negative reinforcement associated
with the sudden decline in anxiety or fear (relief) when the task is completed prior to
the deadline. Research with animals suggests that the mechanisms responsible for
human procrastination may involve systems that derive from several procedures known
to produce similar behavior animals.
Keywords: procrastination, delay discounting, delay reduction theory, Sidman avoidance, negative reinforcement
INTRODUCTION
Comparative psychology has a long history of providing models relevant to human behavior. For
example, there is considerable evidence that Pavlovian conditioning procedures are relevant to
the conditioning of human emotional response (fear conditioning, taste and odor conditioning,
phobias). Similarly, procedures derived from behavior analysis have been found to be relevant
to the training of special needs children to care for themselves. They can respond to alternatives
in direct proportion to the distribution of reinforcements (the matching law; Herrnstein, 1961;
Baum, 1974). Even in the context of complex human decision making, comparative research
has demonstrated the relevance of how animals make decisions (Zentall and Wasserman, 2012).
Comparative research can provide us with hypotheses concerning the evolution and biological basis
of human behavior. Comparative research can often contribute to our understanding of behavior
because the learning processes are often simpler in animals than in humans, and we can better
control the prior learning experiences. Research with animals does have the drawback that we
cannot use their self-report to explain the basis for their choice, so that has to be inferred.
The purpose of the present article is to examine the comparative psychological research for
phenomena that might clarify the mechanisms responsible for the tendency for humans to
procrastinate. I will start with a brief description of the mechanisms thought to be responsible
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for human procrastination. Although procrastination is typically
viewed as a uniquely human phenomenon, the results of
several, well-studied procedures with animals suggest that the
mechanisms involved in procrastination may be closely related
to the behavior that one sees in other animals (see Zentall,
2020). With this in mind, I will identify three lines of animal
research that suggest they are related to human procrastination.
The first, delay discounting is the idea that small immediate
rewards are often preferred over larger delayed rewards. Steel and
König (2006) have proposed that temporal motivation theory,
based on delay discounting, to be the mechanism responsible
for human procrastination (see also Steel, 2007). According to
this theory, completion of the required task represents the larger
delayed reward and competing activities represent the smaller
more immediate rewards.
The second line of research is free operant, temporal
avoidance, a procedure in which an aversive event is signaled
only by the passage of time (Sidman, 1966). It is a procedure that
Zentall (2020) identified as analogous to human procrastination
in which an animal will receive a shock if it does not make a
required response within a defined interval of time.
The third mechanism is negative reinforcement, the idea
that the removal of an aversive event can be reinforcing. If
completion of the required task relives anxiety it can provide an
additional incentive for repeated procrastination. To the extent
that these mechanisms are involved in human procrastination,
understanding them may allow for a better appreciation for why
we procrastinate and potentially, what we can do to reduce its
negative effects.
PROCRASTINATION BY HUMANS
Procrastination is often viewed as a trait (e.g., Arvey et al.,
2003), and generally a somewhat negative trait (Schouwenburg,
2004). However, it is more realistically viewed as a graded
continuum that is affected by many contextual and experiential
variables. One way to view procrastination is the balance
between the aversiveness of the approaching deadline, together
with the anxiety associated with missing the deadline, vs. the
attractiveness of alternative activities (e.g., watching television
or socializing). Viewed from this perspective, procrastination is
typically the choice between an immediate positive activity and
the delayed avoidance of a negative outcome (missing a deadline).
Research with animals comes with an inherent challenge, one
is limited to their motor behavior because they cannot report how
they feel about their choices. On the other hand, what people
say about their behavior may not always reflect their underlying
motivation. Often humans do not know why they make their
choices nor how they feel about them afterwards. Focus on the
behavior of animals strips the behavior down to basic principles
and allows us to observe the behavior in the absence of human
cultural effects. It also allows us to consider the possibility that in
the context in which the behavior evolved, the behavior may not
be as irrational as it may first appear.
It is well known that humans function using two different
systems. One involves implicit (automatic), fast subconscious
processes such as procedural, skill, and habit learning that are
associated with brain activity in the basal ganglia (Mishkin et al.,
1984). The other involves an explicit (controlled), slow conscious
process such as executive attention, working memory hypothesis
testing and rule formation that are associated with brain activity
in the prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate gyrus, the head
of the caudate nucleus, and the hippocampus (Fuster, 1989). In
humans, it is often difficult to separate the implicit and explicit
processes that may be involved in procrastination. To the degree
that we do not have easy access to the implicit processes that may
be present in human procrastination, we may be able to learn
about them from studying other animals.
THE EXPLICIT STUDY OF
PROCRASTINATION IN ANIMALS
Surprisingly, there has been very little research with animals
directed to the study of procrastination itself. This may be
because it is difficult to imagine an aversive task for an animal,
such as writing a term paper for a human, that can be
delayed but not omitted. One of the only studies on animal
procrastination was conducted with pigeons (Mazur, 1996). In
that experiment, pigeons were given a choice between completing
a peck requirement early and completing a peck requirement
late. Mazur’s procedure was relatively complex so I will go over
it. He started with a procedure that looks somewhat like delay
discounting. He gave pigeons a choice between making 5 pecks
after 6 s or making more than 5 pecks after 20 s (see Figure 1).
He asked, how many pecks would it take after 20 s for the pigeon
to be indifferent between the sooner 5-peck requirement and the
deferred increased peck requirement. He found that the pigeons
chose to make up to 30 pecks if they could defer pecking for as
little as 14 s (the difference between 20 and 6 s).
To further complicate matters, in Mazur’s procedure, the
time before the peck requirement (as well as after the peck
requirement) was signaled by a houselight and during those
intervals, intermittent food was provided on a variable time
schedule (occasionally, food was made available independent
of pecking). The intermittent food presented before engaging
in the pecking task can be thought of as humans engaging in
pleasurable activities and it is clear that the pigeons preferred
to delay engaging in the pecking because they were willing to
peck six times as much if they could defer the pecking task.
In effect, what this means is that when pecking was required,
it represented a period during which reinforcement could not
be obtained. Mazur found that the pigeons preferred delaying
the nonreinforced peck requirement. They preferred delaying
the pecking, likely because the peck requirement interrupted
the food-associated houselight cue. Consequently, in addition to
deferring the pecking requirement, it is likely that the pigeons
preferred to extend the conditioned stimulus (houselight) during
which time they could receive food. Extending the conditioned
stimulus (houselight) can be thought of as similar to humans
choosing to engage in a pleasurable activity such as socializing
with friends or watching television, rather than working on a
term paper.
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FIGURE 1 | After Mazur (1996). Pigeons were fed during the timed intervals on a variable time schedule (response independent). The variable response requirement
was titrated until the pigeon was indifferent between the two chains. The measure of procrastination was the number of pecks required (>5) for the pigeons to be
indifferent between the two chains.
PROCRASTINATION AND DELAY
DISCOUNTING
When one procrastinates, one is often choosing to delay an
aversive activity to engage in a pleasant or less aversive activity.
Steel and König (2006) present a theory of procrastination
called temporal motivation theory. This theory is based on
several human parameters but most notable is the discounting
of the value of a future outcome, as a function of the time
(or delay) to that outcome. Thus, procrastination can be
viewed in the broader context of delay discounting. Delay
discounting is generally applied to contexts in which the
choice is between a smaller reward sooner and a larger
reward later (Ainslie, 1975). Depending on the nature of
the reward, the amounts of the smaller and larger rewards,
and the delay between the shorter and longer reward,
one often finds that there is a smaller sooner reward
that will be preferred over the larger later reward. For
example, a person might prefer an offer of $5 now over $10
next week.
Research on delay discounting of rewards suggests that
humans (and other animals) often make decisions to select a
smaller reward sooner rather than a larger reward later, decisions
that that are usually considered to be suboptimal (e.g., Odum,
2011). The decisions are suboptimal in the sense that the amount
of reward obtained is less than would be obtained had they waited
for the larger reward.
Although some have suggested that procrastination, choice
of the smaller sooner, involves the irrational putting off of a
task (Silver and Sabini, 1981; Akerlof, 1991), in the context
of delay discounting, at the time the decision is made, it may
not be considered irrational by the decision maker. Even if an
individual intends not to procrastinate in advance, and possibly
later regrets having procrastinated, it does not alter the fact that
at the time the decision to procrastinate was made, it may have
been a rational decision—a choice between two alternatives, one
that had a greater value to the individual at that time than the
other alternative.
For humans, when it comes to purchasing things, if one does
not have the money, one may charge the items to a credit card,
rather than waiting until enough money is saved to buy the items
with cash. If the items represent something the individual wants
but perhaps does not need, some people would consider these
purchases to be irrational. However, choosing the smaller sooner
is not always an irrational choice. For example, it is quite rare
to wait until one has accumulated enough money to purchase a
house. Instead, it is considered quite rational to save enough for
a down-payment and then obtain a mortgage for the rest, even if
taking on a mortgage means paying much more for the privilege
of living in the house sooner. In both of these cases waiting
would be aversive, but most people would consider taking out
a mortgage for the purchase of a house to be a rational decision,
whereas somemight consider the purchase of less necessary items
to be able to enjoy them right away to be an impulsive irrational
choice. Thus, in some cases, it would be considered quite rational
to incur the greater cost to obtain the benefit sooner.
One could argue that in the case of procrastination the choice
does not involve a deferred reward but a deferred somewhat
aversive task. Thus, perhaps a better animal analog to human
procrastination is one involving the deferring of an aversive
event. Such a procedure was used by Liley et al. (2019). They gave
rats a choice between two levers, one that provided one pellet
of food and the other that provided three pellets of food. If the
rats chose the three-pellet lever, however, they also received a
foot shock (analogous to having to complete an aversive task).
Although for the rats, the pellets were delivered immediately,
the shock was delivered after a delay. What they found was
the more delayed the shock, the more preferred was the three-
pellet alternative. If one considers the shock to be analogous
to an impending deadline, the further off the deadline, the
more likely the rats were to choose the more reinforcing three-
pellet alternative. That is, when the deadline (shock) was more
imminent, the rats chose to avoid the more favorable three-pellet
reward with its accompanying penalty (fear of shock) in favor of
the less favorable one-pellet reward.
Delay discounting and procrastination both involve the
choice between a more immediate positive event and a more
delayed alternative event. In the case of delay discounting, the
immediate and delayed events are typically appetitive. In the
case of procrastination, the immediate event may be appetitive
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(e.g., watching TV) or aversive (e.g., washing dishes), but the
immediate event is usually less aversive than the delayed event
(e.g., writing a term paper).
THE POWER OF THE HYPERBOLIC
FUNCTION OF DELAY DISCOUNTING
Some have proposed that it is considered procrastination only
when delaying the start of the task is unintentional (Silver
and Sabini, 1981; Lay and Silverman, 1996). That is, if one
intentionally delays the start of the task it would be considered
an informed planned decision, unlikely to create anxiety. One can
argue, however, that procrastination is always intentional, at least
it is at the time one decides to procrastinate. Although one may
come to regret the decision to procrastinate later, at the time the
decision to procrastinate was made, one could argue that it was
an intentional decision to put off completing the required task.
Alternatively, when one procrastinates, one does not consider the
likely negative effects of procrastination. It is not always a choice
but it may be an impulsive decision to engage in the alternative
activity. This realization may identify one means of dealing with
both procrastination and the impulsive choice of the smaller
sooner reward. If one understands the appeal of the smaller
sooner reward, one can plan ahead to avoid putting oneself
in a position to make that choice. For example, to avoid the
“temptation” to socialize with friends or watch TV, a student may
decide to go to the library to begin working on a term paper. One
can think of going to the library as making a prior commitment
to work on the paper. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) found
that people are willing to create self-imposed deadlines to help
overcome procrastination.
Surprisingly, a similar effect can be demonstrated in non-
human animals. The concept of making a prior commitment
was tested in pigeons by Rachlin and Green (1972). They first
showed that for a given choice between a smaller sooner reward
and a (two times) larger later reward, the delay was such that
the pigeons preferred the smaller sooner reward. They then
modified the procedure such that 10 s prior to being given
the choice between the smaller-sooner/larger-later reward, the
FIGURE 2 | Design of the Rachlin and Green (1972) experiment. Given an immediate choice between Green (2-s delay and 4-s reinforcement) and Red (immediate
2-s reinforcement) pigeons preferred Red. However, given an initial choice between Green alone or a choice between Green and Red, pigeons preferred Green alone.
It looks like they make a “commitment” to avoid the “temptation” to choose Red.
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FIGURE 3 | Hyperbolic delay discounting function. At time 1 (t1 ) the value of the smaller reward is greater than the value of the larger reward. At time 2 (t2) there is a
reversal of preference.
pigeons were given a choice between receiving the delayed
smaller-sooner/larger-later choice and making a commitment to
receive only the larger-later outcome (see Figure 2). That is, they
could choose to later choose between the smaller sooner and
larger later or choose to commit to the larger later. When given
this earlier choice, the pigeons elected to avoid the later smaller-
sooner/larger-later choice and instead they chose to commit
themselves to the larger later reward. Thus, getting the pigeons to
make a prior commitment got them to make the optimal choice.
For the student needing to write the term paper, the decision to
go to the library to work on her term paper before encountering
the immediacy of alternative pleasurable activities, likely serves a
similar function.
Nature of the Function: Exponential With 2
Different k Values or Hyperbolic With Only
One
The decline in the delay discounting function with time to
reinforcement can be described either by an exponential decay
function or a hyperbolic decay function. The exponential (e)
would take the form of Equation 1 (Mazur, 1987) in which V =
the value of the discounted reward, A = the magnitude of the
reward, D = the delay to the reward, and k = a constant that
represents the rate at which the value declines with delay.
V = Ae−kD (1)






In this equation, as well, V= the value of the discounted reward,
A = the magnitude of the reward, D = the delay to the reward,
and k= represents the rate at which the value declines with delay.
The exponential conforms empirically to the preference
for the smaller sooner over the larger later reward, but
it does not account for the well documented reversal of
preference when equal increments in delay are added
to both the smaller and larger rewards (Rachlin and
Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974; see Figure 3). The exponential
decay function can be salvaged if one assigns greater k
value to the smaller sooner reward than to the larger
later reward, but that requires two different values
to the k parameter.
The hyperbolic delay function (see Figure 3) allows for the
reversal of preference without assuming two different values of
k. According to the hyperbolic decay function, assuming that at
time t1 one prefers the smaller sooner reward over the larger
later reward, the preference can reverse if the choice between the
smaller sooner and larger later can be made somewhat earlier
(e.g., at t2 rather than at t1). Thus, the hyperbolic function can
explain how it might be that before the choice between the task
and competing activities are immanent, at a time when one has
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the intention of start to work on the task at an appropriate
time, one can make a commitment to not be tempted by
other activities. According to the hyperbolic delay discounting
function, in the absence of such a commitment, when other
activities become more immediate, they will take on more value
and will complete more successfully with the larger later task.
THE FREE OPERANT, TEMPORAL
AVOIDANCE PROCEDURE
Delay discounting is the basis of Steel and König (2006) temporal
motivation theory. It is based on the discounting of rewards that
will occur in the future. The weakness of delay discounting as
an account of procrastination is it does not capture the build-
up in anxiety that often accompanies procrastination because the
in the typical delay discounting procedure, the delayed event is
not aversive. A better analog of procrastination that does involve
a future aversive task is the free operant, temporal avoidance
procedure (Sidman, 1966, often referred to as Sidman avoidance).
With this procedure, for example, a rat is given a shock unless it
makes a response (e.g., jumping over a barrier) and it must do so,
for example, within 20 s of its last response (or shock). In spite of
the fact that there is no external stimulus presented to alert the rat
to the impending shock, rats readily learn to jump over a barrier
to avoid the shock. An interesting problem for learning theory
is, given that a rat learns to successfully avoid the shock, it does
so for a very long time. But what maintains the response in the
absence of an occasional shock to support the jumping response
(see Solomon et al., 1952).
According to Mowrer’s (1947) two-factor theory, in avoidance
learning there are two factors. The first factor is the Pavlovian
association that develops between the signal for shock (in this
case the passage of time) and the shock. Due to that association,
the passage of time following the last response or shock is
presumed to elicit fear. The animal then learns that the cues
(feedback) from making the instrumental response (the jump)
become safety signals for the absence of shock (see Bolles and
Grossen, 1969). Those safety signals result in fear reduction,
negative reinforcers. Thus, in Sidman avoidance, although there
is no external signal for shock, the passage of time since the last
response or shock may serve such a function.
If fear of shock in the free operant temporal avoidance
procedure is analogous to fear (or anxiety) associated with
missing the deadline for humans, one might expect to see a
form of procrastination by the rats as they learn about the
contingencies of the task. In the temporal avoidance procedure,
to avoid getting shocked, the rats can jump over the barrier
at any time before the shock. Once they have learned the
contingencies of the task, a temporal discrimination, however,
FIGURE 4 | Hypothetical plot of the relation between the interaction of two emotions, the aversiveness of the task and the aversiveness of anxiety resulting from the
fear of doing poorly or of missing the deadline. The model predicts that work on the task will begin when anxiety approaches the aversion to the task.
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they tend not to press the lever immediately following the last
response or shock. Instead, they generally delay making the
shock avoidance response until near the end of the interval
(Sidman, 1962; Hineline and Herrnstein, 1970). That is, they
tend to procrastinate by waiting until shortly before the shock
would arrive.
According to two-factor theory, the passage of time increases
fear, but with training, the rats learn that shock will not come
early in the interval, so they are not fearful, and they do not press
earlier than they need to. The fear presumably builds up gradually
until it reaches the point at which the shock is soon expected, and
then the response is made.
A simplified model of human procrastination is assumed
to follow a time course similar to that of the temporal
avoidance procedure. The aversiveness of the task is relatively
constant, whereas the anxiety (presumably resulting from
the fear of not completing the task prior to the deadline)
builds up, gradually at first and then progressively faster (see
Figure 4). The model presented in Figure 4 assumes that the
source of procrastination is competition between two aversive
motivations, task aversiveness and anxiety. From a learning
theoretic perspective, however, one might expect that the
many experiences of building anxiety that one undergoes, over
many instances of task postponement, would result in reduced
procrastination. In fact, people who procrastinate often do have
regrets (Ferrari et al., 2009), and they often assert that in the
future they will start working on the required task earlier—a
resolution that often goes unfulfilled. A possible explanation for
the maintenance of procrastination, even with continued feelings
of frustration at the build-up of anxiety each time, is that the
procrastination behavior itself may be reinforced. I will now
address that possibility.
RECENT ANIMAL RESEARCH
Can Task Completion Shortly Before a
Deadline Serve as a Reinforcing Event?
As noted earlier, people who procrastinate often vow that
in the future they will start working on the required task
earlier. Yet, chronic procrastinators rarely do. To account for
persistent procrastination, one can posit that there is something
about procrastination itself that is reinforcing. If procrastination
produces an increase in anxiety (a negative affect), a reasonable
source of reinforcement might be negative reinforcement in the
form of relief (the removal of an aversive event) when the task
has been completed before the deadline. Furthermore, the closer
to the deadline the task is completed, the greater would be
the anxiety prior to working on the task and thus, the greater
the magnitude of the negative reinforcer would be upon task
FIGURE 5 | Negative reinforcement (NRf) associated with the reduction in anxiety will depend on the amount of anxiety experienced and will increase as the time left
approaches the deadline.
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completion. For this reason, it is possible that the sense of
relief that one experiences when completing a task close to the
deadline actually maintains procrastination. A model of this
negative reinforcement effect appears in Figure 5, a modification
of Figure 4.
To better understand the negative reinforcement that may
contribute to procrastination, it may be useful to consider the
stimulus events that take place, independent of whether the task
outcome is negative or positive reinforcement and relate those
events to basic principles of reinforcement.
Fantino’s (1969) delay reduction theory provides a
useful foundation. According to delay reduction theory,
signals for reinforcement become stimuli associated with
reinforcement (conditioned stimuli) to the extent that they
predict reinforcement better when they are present than when
they are absent. This appears to be a simple premise, but it makes
some important predictions. According to this theory, it is not
only how close in time the signal is to reinforcement, but it is
how close in time the signal is to reinforcement, relative to other
events. A nonobvious prediction of delay reduction theory is,
given that a stimulus occurs at a fixed time from reinforcement,
the longer the interval prior to the onset of that stimulus, the
better a conditioned stimulus it will become (Fantino, 1969).
That is, it is the relative proximity to the reinforcer rather than its
absolute proximity that is crucial. Thus, the longer the interval
between a given stimulus-reinforcer pairing, the more effective
the conditioned stimulus should become. Gibbon et al. (1977; see
also Singer et al., 2007) have found support for this prediction.
FIGURE 6 | Design of the Zentall et al. (2018) experiment. Pigeons were given a choice between two reinforced chains, short (FI 5 s) followed by long (FI 15 s) or long
(FI 15 s) followed by short (FI 5 s).
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To better understand this concept, imagine that the pairing
of a light with food occurs every 10 s. In this case, it should
be relatively easy to predict the occurrence of food, even in the
absence of the light. If the pairing of the light with the food
occurred once every hour, however, it would be relatively difficult
to predict the food in the absence of the light. Thus, the light
would become a better signal for the occurrence of food.
Before seeing how this theory may apply to procrastination,
we decided to test delay reduction theory in a context more
relevant to procrastination than had been done earlier. That is,
with a procedure in which the total time to reinforcement (the
“deadline”) is held constant, but the duration of conditioned
stimulus associated with the deadline is varied.
Imagine the following scenario: there is a fixed delay to
reinforcement (or in the case of procrastination, the deadline)
with a choice between two stimulus chains (to procrastinate
or not). One chain starts with presentation of a long
interval, signaled by Stimulus A (analogous to the period of
procrastination, before working on the task), followed by a short
interval, signaled by Stimulus B (analogous to time working on
the task), followed by reinforcement (see Figure 6). The other
chain starts with presentation of a short interval, signaled by
Stimulus C (time working on the task), followed by a long
interval, signaled by Stimulus D (time after working on the task),
followed by reinforcement. At this point there is no actual task,
just stimuli that signal time periods prior to the reinforcer.
According to delay reduction theory, although the two
chains represent the same total delay to reinforcement, the
chain represented by the long interval followed by the short
interval presents a short interval just prior to reinforcement.
Thus, that stimulus should serve as a very good, conditioned
stimulus. Not only should the short Stimulus B be preferred
over the long Stimulus D that also appears just prior to the
reinforcer, but importantly, the short Stimulus B also should
be preferred over the short Stimulus C that occurs earlier in
the other chain (Fantino, 1969). If presentation of the long
interval early can be thought of as analogous to deferring
task completion, and presentation of the short stimulus early
as analogous to completing the task early, could experiencing
the short stimulus immediately before the reinforcer (the
deadline) be more reinforcing than experiencing the short
stimulus earlier?
Initially, we tested this hypothesis by asking if pigeons would
prefer a long-short interval chain over a short-long interval chain,
both of the same total duration. In our first experiment (see
Figure 6), the pigeons showed a 2–1 preference for the long-short
interval chain over the short-long interval chain (Zentall et al.,
2018). In addition, the relative peck rate to the short 5 s stimulus
that was immediately followed by reinforcement (Stimulus B)
was significantly greater than to both the short 5 s stimulus (C)
that was followed by the relatively long 15 s stimulus (D), and
to the relatively long 15-s stimulus (D) that was immediately
FIGURE 7 | Proportion of pecks to each of the four components of the two chains depicted in Figure 5. Pigeons preferred the long-short (procrastination) chain over
the short-long (“pre-crastination”) chain.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 769928
Zentall Procrastination Maintained by Negative Reinforcement
followed by reinforcement (see Figure 7). Thus, it appears that
the short stimulus that was followed by reinforcement became
a stronger conditioned stimulus, and it is likely that it was
responsible for the preference for the long-short interval chain.
Although this experiment did not include an aversive event or
a task that one would normally associate with procrastination,
it did show that task completion events close to the deadline
may become strong conditioned stimuli. The next step was to
interpolate a mildly aversive event between the two intervals in
each chain to simulate a task that elicits the motivation to defer.
Given the nature of the concurrent chains task, we were
looking for an event that had been shown to be mildly aversive,
one that might be seen as analogous to writing a term paper.
McDevitt et al. (1997) found that preference for a conditioned
stimulus was greatly reduced when a period with no stimulus,
a dark period preceded it, even when the dark period did not
increase the time to reinforcement. If one views the dark period
as a mildly aversive event, one can ask, if pigeons are not able to
avoid a dark period, would they choose to defer the dark period
to later in the trial?
FIGURE 8 | Design of the Zentall et al. (2020, Experiment 1) experiment. Pigeons were given a choice between two reinforced chains, short (FI 2 s) followed by long
(FI 15 s) or long (FI 15 s) followed by short (FI 2 s), with a 5 s dark period (a gap) between the two links of each chain.
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FIGURE 9 | Apparatus used in the Zentall et al. (2020, Experiment 1). Pigeons made a choice between stimulus lights A and B. If they chose A, they would have to
peck A1 10 times and then peck stimulus X for reinforcement. If they chose B, they would have to peck B1 10 times and then peck stimulus X for reinforcement.
Zentall et al. (2020, Experiment 1) tested pigeons with a
procedure similar to that used by Zentall et al. (2018) but they
added a 4 s dark period between the two intervals in each chain
(see Figure 8). They found, once again, that pigeons chose to
delay experiencing the relatively aversive dark period. That is,
they procrastinated receiving the aversive dark period.
Although we now had suggestive evidence that pigeons would
defer a relatively aversive dark period in a chain that led to
reinforcement, we wanted to test pigeons with a task that
more closely resembled a human procrastination task. For that
purpose, we selected a task in which to obtain a reinforcer,
the pigeon had to walk from one end of a long cage to
the other end of the cage (see Figure 9). On the way, the
pigeon had to perform a pecking task (Zentall et al., 2020,
Experiment 2). The pecking could occur closer to the start or
closer to the goal (farther from the start). The results of this
experiment indicated that the pigeons preferred to defer the peck
requirement. That is, they preferred to procrastinate making the
side-key pecking response.
Taken together, the results of the pigeon research are
consistent with the hypothesis that deferring a task requirement
can be reinforcing for pigeons. For humans, if one considers
the relief that one feels upon completion of a task as serving
as a negative reinforcer, and the closer task completion comes
to the deadline, the greater the negative reinforcer (the removal
of an aversive event), it can potentially explain why it is that
procrastination can become a habitual behavior. Although one
may readily remember the build-up of anxiety that occurs
as the deadline approaches, and that build-up of anxiety
may be responsible for a pledge to avoid procrastinating
in the future, it may well be that it is the relief from
anxiety that occurs upon completion of the task that makes
it difficult to stick to one’s intention not to procrastinate in
the future.
CONCLUSIONS
The ubiquity of procrastination suggests that certain basic
behavioral processes are likely to be involved. The fact that
these basic behavioral processes demonstrate behavior similar to
human procrastination suggests that cultural factors are not likely
to be necessary and individual differences such as laziness, fear of
failure and perfectionism are not critical components. Temporal
motivation theory proposed by Steel (2007) demonstrates the
role that delay discounting plays in procrastination and that
phenomenon has beenwidely demonstrated in humans and other
animals (e.g., Ainslie, 1974). In addition, it is very likely that
free-operant temporal avoidance learning (Sidman, 1966), delay
reduction theory (Fantino, 1969), and negative reinforcement
(Zentall et al., 2020) all contribute to procrastination and
especially to its persistence. Although some researchers have
viewed procrastination as a trait rather than as behavior
that is context and experience dependent, the involvement
of these basic mechanisms suggests that people may learn to
procrastinate. Furthermore, if negative reinforcement, associated
with the abrupt decline in anxiety that typically accompanies
task completion, reinforces procrastination, it may be difficult
for one to avoid procrastinating in the future, even if one has
the best of intentions. The demonstration of the similarity of
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the behavior of non-human species to human procrastination
suggests, importantly, that cultural factors as well as human
traits such as perfectionism, laziness, and fear of failure are not
necessary to explain human procrastination.
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